Home NewsMiddle East Working Groups Analyze Israel’s Political Future and Regional Stability Amid Netanyahu’s Expected Victory

Middle East Working Groups Analyze Israel’s Political Future and Regional Stability Amid Netanyahu’s Expected Victory

by Mark Ellison

WASHINGTON – Weekly working groups comprising academics, diplomats, senior intelligence officers, and business representatives are convening across 15 Arab nations, the U.S. State Department, and the foreign ministries of Indonesia and Malaysia to analyze the political trajectory of Israel.

These high-level discussions, which occur once a week, reveal a strategic consensus among regional players: despite significant reservations, there is a prevailing expectation that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will maintain power in the next election.

The meetings signify a coordinated effort by regional powers to anticipate Israeli governance shifts and the subsequent impact on Middle Eastern stability. Participants maintain active channels of communication with representatives of Israel’s Arab sector, former Israeli diplomats, military figures, and journalists specializing in Arab affairs.

Regional Perceptions of Israeli Leadership

Among the working groups, analysts are closely monitoring the internal dynamics of the Israeli government and the constraints of Israel’s fragmented coalition system. While Netanyahu remains the central focus, Avigdor Lieberman has emerged as a figure of particular interest to Arab analysts, who describe him as “a strong man with principles” and a potential kingmaker in any future coalition arithmetic.

In Egypt, the perception of Lieberman is complicated by his historical threats to bomb the Aswan Dam. However, some officials argue that his practical relationship with Russia makes him a key variable. Analysts suggest that “he maintains a practical relationship in Russia, and it should be taken into account that at the end of the process he will join the coalition if Netanyahu wins the election.”

There is a noted lack of understanding within these groups regarding why Netanyahu, alongside Naftali Bennett and Gadi Eisenkot, has rejected outreach to Israel’s Arab community, despite the potential electoral and governance implications of deeper Arab participation in Israeli institutions, including the Knesset and local councils.

The Palestinian Question and the “Solution Initiative”

A primary point of contention in these meetings is the perceived disregard within the Israeli political discourse for the future of the West Bank and the role of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, whose authority rests on interim arrangements first framed in the Oslo Accords.

“The two-state solution is not even on your agenda,” a former Egyptian army officer, familiar with former Israeli negotiators, stated.

The former officer argued that no viable arrangement can be reached without a resolution to the Palestinian issue, specifically proposing that Palestinian forces be introduced into the Gaza Strip to replace Hamas. He stressed that such a transition could only be achieved through direct cooperation with Israel and with clear security guarantees for both sides.

These groups are currently tracking a potential “solution initiative” intended to reshape regional diplomacy and, ultimately, the parameters of any renewed peace process:

  • Step 1: The drafting of a consolidated position paper to be sent to Washington, outlining Arab and Muslim-majority states’ minimum expectations on borders, security, and governance.
  • Step 2: Distribution of the paper across Arab states and Europe to test for consensus and to align messaging ahead of any U.S.-brokered initiative.
  • Step 3: The expectation that Donald Trump will present an “Arab peace plan” focusing on the West Bank and Gaza, framed as part of a broader regional stabilization effort.

This proposed plan emphasizes the unification of the two territories through the cooperation of West Bank intelligence, military, and police forces, supported by American forces, mirroring plans implemented in southern Lebanon. Diplomats involved in the discussions stress that any such arrangement would require clear mandates under existing international agreements and a sequenced timetable to avoid a security vacuum.

South Lebanon protesters burn Israeli flag (Photo: Mahmoud ZAYYAT / AFP)

State of Diplomatic Ties

The current landscape of Israel’s formal relationships with Arab nations shows a stark contrast between official treaties and on-the-ground realities, particularly in trade, tourism, and security coordination.

Peace Treaties and the Abraham Accords

  • Egypt (1979): The peace treaty remains in effect and underpins military coordination in Sinai, but direct commercial flights are non-existent. Israelis may enter the Sinai without visas, though the atmosphere in tourism zones has deteriorated and people-to-people contact has narrowed.
  • Jordan (1994): The peace treaty also remains in effect. While Israeli tourism to Petra and Aqaba has declined, the border at Aqaba remains a critical economic lifeline for Jordanian workers who cross daily to staff hotels and service industries on the Israeli side.
  • Abraham Accords: Israel maintains ambassadors in Morocco, Abu Dhabi, and Bahrain under normalization agreements that have opened direct flights, investment channels, and cautious security dialogue. Sudan, originally a partner in the accords, is no longer active in the process amid its internal instability, and officials in the working groups describe that pause as a warning sign for the durability of transactional normalization.

The Saudi Arabia Deadlock

The relationship between Jerusalem and Riyadh remains a critical missed opportunity and a central focus of the working groups’ discussions on long-term regional architecture. In November 2020, Netanyahu was invited to a secret visit to the Saudi city of Neom, accompanied by then-U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.

The meeting was intended to remain confidential, but a leak the following day caused significant friction with the Saudi hosts and reinforced Riyadh’s insistence on tightly controlled diplomatic choreography. Since the events of October 7, 2023, Saudi Arabia has solidified its diplomatic requirements and linked any future normalization to concrete progress on the Palestinian file.

Saudi Arabia now maintains an unequivocal demand for a two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians as a prerequisite for normalization, aligning its position more explicitly with long-standing Arab League parameters and, officials note, raising the stakes for any Israeli government seeking deeper integration into the region’s political and security framework.

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