war

VIENNA –
The head of the U.N.’s nuclear watchdog said Monday his agency has “no indication” that any of Iran’s nuclear installations have been damaged amid ongoing Israeli-U.S. strikes, but warned that with missiles still flying a “possible radiological release with serious consequences” could not be ruled out. Opening a closed-door session of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, Director General Rafael Grossi urged “the utmost restraint” and said efforts to reach Iran’s nuclear regulator were continuing “with no response so far.”

As governments braced for further volleys across the Middle East, Grossi cautioned that the region’s civilian nuclear footprint heightens the stakes. “Iran and many other countries in the region that have been subjected to military attacks have operational nuclear power plants and nuclear research reactors, as well as associated fuel storage sites, increasing the threat to nuclear safety,” he said, calling the situation “very concerning.” “I reiterate my call on all parties to exercise maximum restraint to avoid further escalation.”

“We cannot rule out a possible radiological release with serious consequences, including the necessity to evacuate areas as large or larger than major cities.”

Why nuclear safety is uniquely exposed in this conflict

For the IAEA, the current barrages are not only a security crisis but a test of rules built up over decades to keep wartime away from nuclear infrastructure. Even absent visible damage, modern nuclear facilities can become vulnerable in conflict due to power loss, disrupted cooling, stressed staff or impaired communications. Grossi has repeatedly outlined the agency’s “Seven Indispensable Pillars” for nuclear safety and security in armed conflict-from maintaining physical integrity and off-site power to ensuring reliable communications and emergency response capacity-warning that breaching any pillar increases accident risk.

Technical hazards are not confined to reactors. Iran’s enrichment sites handle uranium hexafluoride (UF6), a chemically toxic compound that, if released inside a facility, poses inhalation risks even when external radiation readings remain normal. The IAEA told the U.N. Security Council last year that strikes which sever power or damage containment at enrichment or research facilities could force wide-area protective actions, depending on the scale and location. Those briefings have underpinned recent calls from European and regional governments for conflict parties to avoid any operations that could impair nuclear safety systems.

What the IAEA says it knows-and doesn’t

On Monday, Grossi stated: “We have no indication that any of the nuclear installations, including the Bushehr nuclear power plant, the Tehran research reactor, or other nuclear fuel cycle facilities have been damaged or hit.” He added that the agency was seeking contact with Iran’s regulator “with no response so far.” That communication gap, diplomats noted, limits the agency’s ability to corroborate its remote assessments and could delay on‑the‑ground assistance if conditions deteriorate.

Independent radiation monitoring across the wider region showed no abnormal releases after the June 2025 strikes that first targeted Iranian nuclear facilities, though the agency stressed then-as now-that the absence of off‑site spikes does not eliminate on‑site risks or the possibility of future incidents if hostilities intensify. For board members meeting in Vienna, that distinction is central: as long as inspectors lack routine access, the IAEA cannot fully assure states that all nuclear material remains accounted for and all installations remain intact.

Iran’s enriched uranium: figures that frame today’s risk

Despite U.S. strikes in June 2025 that President Donald Trump said “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program, the IAEA recently assessed that Iran still holds a substantial stockpile of highly enriched material. As of its latest restricted report circulated in late February, the agency put Iran’s 60%-enriched uranium at roughly 440.9 kilograms-about 972 pounds-one technical step below weapons grade.

Grossi underscored that point on February 19: “Most of the material that Iran had accumulated up until June of last year, despite the [U.S.] bombings and the attacks, is still there, in large quantities, where it was at the time of the strikes. … Some of it may be less accessible, but the material is still there.” His remarks have fed concern among non-proliferation officials that any further loss of monitoring data could make it harder to reconstruct what happened to that stockpile in the event of damage or diversion.

International experts note that enrichment to 60% is unprecedented for a non‑nuclear‑weapon state and significantly reduces the time needed to reach 90%-the level typically associated with weapons use-if a political decision were taken to cross that threshold. While Grossi has stopped short of saying Iran is actively moving to weaponize, he has warned repeatedly that “the trajectory of the program” and shrinking transparency are “not compatible” with the level of confidence member states expect from the safeguards system.

The legal and institutional guardrails at stake

International humanitarian law places special constraints on attacks against “works and installations containing dangerous forces,” including nuclear electrical generating stations. Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, Article 56, and long‑standing IAEA General Conference resolutions warn that strikes on nuclear facilities risk grave transboundary consequences, reinforcing the agency’s position that such sites should never be targeted. Those provisions are now being actively cited in diplomatic démarches to capitals involved in the current exchanges of fire.

Beyond wartime protections, Iran remains bound by its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement under the Nuclear Non‑Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Years of reduced access and monitoring gaps have already degraded the IAEA’s ability to verify the completeness of Iran’s nuclear declarations-an impediment the agency says must be remedied to restore confidence among member states and to underpin any future sanctions relief. Board delegates on Monday were also briefed on how the agency’s verification work in Iran interacts with U.N. Security Council resolutions and national export‑control regimes, underscoring that technical monitoring decisions in Vienna can translate directly into policy choices in world capitals.

Diplomacy under strain, urgency reiterated

The latest board session comes days after U.S.-Iran nuclear talks ended without a deal, even as Washington maintains that last year’s strikes set back-but did not eliminate-Iran’s nuclear capabilities. The IAEA’s inability to confirm whether enrichment has ceased at bombed sites complicates both verification and any prospective accord, raising questions about how negotiators would sequence sanctions relief against steps to restore monitoring and cap Iran’s stockpile.

Grossi, who has been shuttling among capitals to salvage a pathway to de‑escalation, pressed for renewed negotiations. He framed the diplomatic track as the only sustainable route to manage nuclear risk in wartime conditions and to re‑establish comprehensive verification. He urged parties to resume talks “as quickly as possible,” arguing that each additional day of strikes without direct communication with Iran’s regulator increases the margin of uncertainty the IAEA must report to its 35‑nation board.

As of late Monday in Vienna, the IAEA reported “no indication” that Iran’s nuclear installations had been hit and said it was still attempting to reach Iran’s nuclear regulator, “with no response so far.” For governments weighing next steps, that combination-no confirmed damage, but no direct line into the facilities most at risk-is likely to sharpen the debate over how far military action can go before it collides with the red lines of the global nuclear safety regime.