Home HealthWHO Declares Ebola Outbreak in DRC and Uganda a Public Health Emergency of International Concern

WHO Declares Ebola Outbreak in DRC and Uganda a Public Health Emergency of International Concern

by Claire Donovan

The World Health Organization (WHO) has designated the current Ebola outbreak spanning the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Uganda as a “public health emergency of international concern.” The move comes after reports of at least 80 deaths, signaling a critical need for coordinated international intervention to prevent further regional destabilization.

While the agency noted that the outbreak does not meet the criteria for a pandemic, it warned that the data collected so far pointed to a “potentially much larger outbreak than what is currently being detected and reported”. The decision activates emergency provisions under the WHO’s governing rules and is intended to push governments and donors toward faster financing, cross‑border surveillance, and support for fragile health systems rather than to signal uncontrolled global spread.

Workers stand guard at the gate of the Kibuli Muslim Hospital where a Congolese man died of Ebola in Kampala, Uganda. (Reuters: Abukbaker Lubowa)

The Bundibugyo Strain and Clinical Gaps

The current crisis is driven by the Bundibugyo virus, one of several orthoebolavirus strains that cause Ebola virus disease. Unlike the more common Zaire ebolavirus, for which highly effective vaccines and monoclonal antibody treatments exist after years of investment prompted by West Africa’s 2014-16 crisis, the Bundibugyo strain presents a significant regulatory and therapeutic vacuum.

This outbreak was described by experts as “extraordinary” because there were no approved Bundibugyo virus-specific therapeutics or vaccines, unlike for Ebola-Zaire strains. “Unfortunately, Bundibugyo has fewer proven countermeasures than Zaire ebolavirus, where vaccines have been highly effective in controlling outbreaks,” noted Amanda Rojek, associate professor of health emergencies at the Pandemic Sciences Institute, University of Oxford.

Despite the lack of targeted treatment, the strain is not considered the most lethal in biological terms. “This particular strain of Ebola is not the most severe, but it seems to be killing about 30 per cent of people who have got infected so far,” said Professor Raina MacIntyre, an epidemiologist and head of the biosecurity program at the Kirby Institute, University of New South Wales.

The high mortality rate is largely attributed to systemic failures in healthcare delivery rather than the virulence of the virus itself. “We do have to remember that those quoted mortality rates are in people that are infected in very resource-poor settings, so often don’t even have access to simple things like intravenous fluids, which can make a big difference,” explained infectious diseases expert Paul Griffin of the University of Queensland. For health ministries in the region, that places renewed pressure on basic clinical capacity – oxygen, fluids, trained staff, and protective gear – rather than on cutting-edge biotechnology alone.

Epidemiological Reach and Caseload

The virus has demonstrated significant geographic mobility, moving from high-traffic mining sectors into urban centers and crossing at least one international border. The Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention identified the Mongwalu health zone as the primary origin point, with subsequent migration to other regions as patients sought care and moved along commercial routes.

Metric/Location Reported Data
Total Suspected Deaths 80
Laboratory-Confirmed Cases 8
Suspected Cases (Ituri Province) 246
DRC Affected Zones Bunia, Rwampara, and Mongbwalu
Uganda Affected Areas Kampala (including deaths of travelers from DRC)

Experts believe the official figures underrepresent the true scale of the event. “There’s probably more than 300 cases,” Professor MacIntyre stated, adding, “Because to grow to be 200 to 300 cases, it’s got to have been going on for a while,” and “So it took the whole world by surprise.” The concern for regional governments is that undercounted cases can translate into undetected transmission chains, complicating border screening, internal travel advisories, and decisions on whether to restrict movement or keep trade corridors open.

Transmission Dynamics and Healthcare Vulnerability

The transmission of the Bundibugyo virus relies on direct contact with infected bodily fluids, though the risk profile extends to specific social and professional environments.

  • Direct Contact: Exposure to blood, vomit, or feces of infected humans or animals (fruit bats, monkeys, apes).
  • Medical Exposure: Use of contaminated needles or syringes and inadequate infection-prevention controls in health facilities.
  • Cultural Practices: Funeral rituals involving the washing or touching of the deceased, especially where safe-burial protocols are difficult to enforce.
  • Sexual Contact: Potential for viral persistence in certain bodily fluids, requiring clear guidance on post-recovery precautions.

The lack of early diagnosis creates a dangerous environment for healthcare providers. “There is an increased risk of health workers developing Ebola after caring for patients, often when the diagnosis isn’t made and they’re not fully protected because they’re not wearing the correct PPE,” Professor MacIntyre noted. For national health authorities, this raises immediate workforce and policy questions: how to maintain routine services when frontline staff fear infection, and how to finance sustained supplies of protective equipment outside donor-funded emergency windows.

The Conflict-Health Nexus in Ituri

The ability to contain the outbreak is severely hampered by the geopolitical instability of the Ituri province. Insecurity driven by Islamic State-backed militants has created “blind spots” in surveillance, preventing rapid response teams from accessing suspected hotspots. This intersection of conflict and contagion often results in delayed detection, allowing the virus to spread undetected through populations before health authorities can intervene.

Local officials are forced to negotiate access with armed groups or rely on fragmented community networks to relay alerts, complicating even basic tasks such as transporting samples or tracing contacts. That in turn affects how central governments in Kinshasa and Kampala calibrate security deployments, humanitarian corridors, and information-sharing with neighboring states wary of importing both instability and disease.

A health official uses a thermometer to screen people in front of Kibuli Muslim Hospital in Kampala, Uganda

A health official uses a thermometer to screen people in front of Kibuli Muslim Hospital in Kampala, Uganda. (AP: Hajarah Nalwadda)

Regulatory Implications of the PHEIC Declaration

The declaration of a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) is a formal regulatory mechanism under the International Health Regulations. It is designed to mobilize international funding and technical expertise when an event is serious, risks international spread, and requires a coordinated response. Once a PHEIC is declared, states parties are expected to share information rapidly, strengthen entry and exit screening, and justify any travel or trade measures they impose under that legal framework.

Professor Griffin emphasized that this is distinct from a pandemic declaration. “Obviously, Ebola is quite a severe disease, although it’s not all that easily transmissible, so it certainly doesn’t have pandemic potential,” he said. “But we have seen some alarming features of this current outbreak, including the fact that it’s across a few jurisdictions.” For policymakers, the designation is therefore less about signalling a global catastrophe and more about unlocking tools for cross-border coordination and accountability.

The primary objective of the WHO’s designation is to bridge the resource gap in the affected regions. “Part of the reason, once again, of declaring the public health emergency of international concern is to make sure there are better resources available where these cases are to try to improve some of those outcomes,” Professor Griffin added. How quickly those resources translate into reinforced clinics in Ituri or better screening in Kampala will now be a test not only of global health governance but of political will in capitals that are watching this outbreak from afar.

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