China-ASEAN 35th Anniversary Highlights Strategic Partnership Amid Economic Integration and Security Challenges

JAKARTA – China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are marking the 35th anniversary of their formal diplomatic engagement, a milestone that underscores one of the most consequential geopolitical axes in the Indo-Pacific.

The relationship, which has evolved from tentative dialogue to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, serves as a primary barometer for stability in Asia. As the two entities navigate an era of heightened systemic competition between the United States and China, the partnership is being tested by a volatile mix of deep economic interdependence and acute territorial disputes.

The trajectory of China-ASEAN relations provides a blueprint for how a global superpower integrates with a bloc of ten diverse nations. The foundation was laid in 1991 during the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, where Beijing first signaled its intent for closer cooperation, eventually becoming a full dialogue partner in 1996.

By 2003, the relationship shifted toward a structured security and political framework with the signing of the Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Bali, Indonesia. This era was marked by China’s accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, a pivotal move that signaled Beijing’s adherence to regional norms of non-interference and peaceful coexistence.

Economic Integration and the RCEP Framework

The economic pillar of the relationship has consistently outpaced political trust. In January 2010, China and ASEAN established a free trade area (FTA), which catalyzed a surge in bilateral trade and infrastructure investment and helped embed regional supply chains spanning manufacturing, energy and digital services.

This integration was further codified through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the world’s largest trading bloc, which includes ASEAN members and its key partners, including China, Japan, and South Korea. The RCEP has effectively streamlined tariffs and rules of origin, cementing China as the primary trading partner for the majority of Southeast Asian states and giving regional policymakers a common framework for trade, investment and standards-setting.

However, this economic gravity creates a complex dependency. While ASEAN nations benefit from Chinese capital and market access, they remain wary of “debt-trap diplomacy” and the asymmetrical power dynamic that accompanies such heavy investment. Finance ministries and central banks across the region are quietly seeking to diversify sources of infrastructure funding, including through multilateral lenders, to avoid overexposure to any single creditor.

Security Friction and the South China Sea

Despite the diplomatic milestones-including the elevation to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in November 2021-the relationship is strained by overlapping territorial claims in the South China Sea.

The dispute centers on Beijing’s “nine-dash line,” which claims vast swaths of waters that conflict with the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of several ASEAN members, including Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia. For ASEAN coastal states, the stakes are not only nationalist sentiment and maritime rights but also control over fisheries, subsea resources and critical sea lanes through which a large share of global trade passes.

These tensions are often managed through the “ASEAN Way”-a diplomatic approach prioritizing consensus and non-confrontation-but the lack of a legally binding Code of Conduct (CoC) remains a critical vulnerability. Negotiations on a CoC have dragged on for years, leaving coast guards, navies and energy regulators to operate in a gray zone where incidents at sea can rapidly acquire strategic significance.

The legal backdrop is equally contested. ASEAN states frequently invoke the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS, as the main reference point for maritime rights and obligations, while Beijing maintains its preference for bilateral talks and often rejects third-party arbitration. The 2016 arbitral ruling in favor of the Philippines, which invalidated key elements of China’s expansive claims, remains a reference for regional legal and policy communities even as Beijing refuses to recognize it.

Writing on the anniversary, Pou Sothirak, former minister of Industry, Mines and Energy of Cambodia, and Him Rotha, deputy director of the Cambodian Center for Regional Studies, highlighted the fragility of the current global climate.

“We are living in a fragile and dangerous world, and there is an urgent need for innovative approaches to peace and security so that international relations – especially among major powers such as the United States and China – are more predictable and constructive,” Sothirak and Rotha noted.

The authors argued that the destiny of Asia depends on translating strategic partnerships into practical cooperation to avoid miscalculations that could spark broader conflict. For ASEAN governments, that translates into a daily balancing act: keeping channels to Beijing open while quietly reinforcing deterrence, often in coordination with extra-regional partners.

Navigating Multipolarity and Internal Crisis

The China-ASEAN dynamic is further complicated by internal regional instabilities and the overarching shadow of the U.S.-China rivalry. For officials in Jakarta, Bangkok, Hanoi and other capitals, the question is no longer whether the region is multipolar, but how its institutions adapt fast enough to manage sharper competition among major powers.

• The Myanmar Crisis: The ongoing conflict in Myanmar since the 2021 coup has tested ASEAN’s internal cohesion, with China maintaining a pragmatic relationship with the military junta while the bloc struggles to implement its “Five-Point Consensus.” The paralysis has exposed the limits of ASEAN’s non-interference principle when confronted with protracted internal conflict and cross-border humanitarian and security spillovers.
• The Balance of Power: The rapid economic rise of China has shifted the regional balance, creating a climate where ASEAN nations must balance their security reliance on the United States with their economic reliance on China. This dual dependence is increasingly reflected in national strategies that speak of “hedging,” “omni-enmeshment” or “strategic autonomy” rather than formal alignment.
• Normative Clashes: There is a persistent tension between the “internationally recognized norms and principles of peaceful coexistence” and the reality of power politics in the region. While ASEAN communiqués routinely reference a rules-based order, implementation on the water and in the air is shaped as much by relative capabilities as by legal texts.

The adherence to international law, specifically the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), remains the primary point of contention. While ASEAN emphasizes a rules-based order, Beijing often prefers bilateral negotiations over multilateral arbitration. For Southeast Asian policymakers, the choice of forum-whether quiet bilateral engagement with China, ASEAN-led processes, or recourse to international tribunals-is now a central instrument of statecraft rather than a purely legal decision.

At the same time, domestic political cycles and governance challenges within ASEAN states shape how far leaders are willing to push Beijing. Governments facing elections or legitimacy crises may lean on nationalist rhetoric in maritime disputes, while those prioritizing growth may downplay tensions in favor of investment, tourism and trade, including with major partners such as the United States, the European Union and Japan.

The current status of the relationship remains a duality: an unprecedented economic alliance operating alongside a precarious security environment. China and ASEAN continue to hold annual summits to manage these tensions, with the 35th anniversary serving as a diplomatic window to reaffirm commitments to regional stability. The test for policymakers on both sides will be whether they can convert ceremonial language into enforceable arrangements-on trade, digital governance, crisis communication and maritime conduct-before the next crisis forces decisions under pressure.