DOHA – A series of strategic “decapitations” across the global landscape has left a trail of power vacuums, where military precision has outpaced political architecture. From the corridors of power in Tehran and Caracas to the volatile borders of Southern Lebanon and the energy arteries of the Strait of Hormuz, a recurring theme of “orphanhood of command” is emerging-a state where the absence of a guarantor of authority is transforming fragile truces into dangerous gambles.
This systemic void is most evident in the current friction between Washington and Tehran. While the United States seeks a definitive diplomatic exit from a cycle of escalation, it finds itself negotiating with a regime that is functionally fragmented. The result is a global environment defined by “intermittency,” where agreements are announced by one faction and denied by another, leaving international markets and regional security frameworks in a state of precarious suspension.
The Doha Paradox and the Rise of General Vahidi
Technical negotiations between the United States and Iran resumed in Doha on 1 July, though the proceedings remain strictly bifurcated. According to Majed al-Ansari, spokesperson for the Qatari Executive, there are no high-level meetings between the two delegations; instead, they are operating under a mechanism of separate contacts facilitated by mediators from Qatar and Pakistan. For Qatar, which has positioned itself as a specialist in back-channel diplomacy, Doha is less a venue than an instrument: a neutral capital offering deniability to rivals who cannot be seen talking directly.
The diplomatic friction is underscored by a stark disconnect in messaging. While U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner have engaged with the Qatari Prime Minister, the Iranian side remains focused on the unfreezing of assets. Qatar currently holds approximately $12 billion in Iranian funds, with $6 billion earmarked for release in the first phase of a memorandum signed on 17 June, reportedly under humanitarian-use conditions consistent with existing U.S. sanctions architecture.
This fragmented reality has already created diplomatic friction. President Trump’s recent claims that Iran had “requested” a meeting appear premature when contrasted with the warnings from Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. Speaking to state television, Ghalibaf asserted that direct talks would not result in a definitive agreement until the memorandum’s terms are fully met, stating that Iran is “prepared for war” if “dialogue is not implemented.”
The duality of this discourse points to a deeper internal struggle within the Iranian apparatus. Intelligence suggests that General Ahmed Vahidi, commander-in-chief of the Revolutionary Guard (IRGC), has effectively seized the lead. Data from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and the Critical Threats Project indicate that mediators are often forced to treat the diplomatic channel and the IRGC as separate entities, each with its own veto power over escalation or restraint.
This “orphanhood of command” means that while Washington may reach an accord with a negotiator, there is no singular authority in Tehran capable of guaranteeing the agreement across the system. The rise of Vahidi-a figure characterized by a maximalist and ruthless approach-has colonized the discourse of even the regime’s moderates, leaving the Iranian state in a condition where the most hardline elements hold the keys to negotiation. For U.S. policymakers, it poses a structural dilemma: any deal that cannot be enforced within Iran’s own chain of command risks becoming another provisional ceasefire in a permanent shadow war.
Lebanese Deadlock and the U.S. Congressional Divide
The fragility of the regional order extends to Southern Lebanon, where Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has reinforced a policy of conditional withdrawal. During a recent visit to the security zone, Netanyahu reiterated that Israeli forces will not depart until Hezbollah is eliminated, issuing an “unshakeable directive” to his troops: “if you identify a threat, act; do not wait.”
This directive clashes with a Washington-sponsored framework agreed upon the previous Friday, which proposed a gradual Israeli withdrawal contingent on the verified disarmament of Hezbollah under international monitoring. On the ground, the conflict persists; the Israeli Army recently reported the killing of a Hezbollah member in Manzala, while the Lebanese Ministry of Health estimates that 4,278 people have died from Israeli bombardments since 2 March.
In the United States, the conflict has triggered a sharp ideological divide within Congress. On Tuesday, the House of Representatives rejected a war powers resolution introduced by Congresswoman Rashida Tlaib, which sought to cut off American intelligence and logistical support for operations against Hezbollah and to reassert the legislature’s authority over the use of force abroad as set out in the War Powers Resolution. The resolution was opposed even by Democratic leadership, reaffirming the designation of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization and underscoring a bipartisan reluctance to be seen as constraining Israel in wartime.
The strategic knot remains symmetrical: Israel refuses to leave without Hezbollah’s disarmament, while Hezbollah-acting as Tehran’s primary proxy-refuses to disarm and continues to justify its arsenal as “resistance.” Without a significant surge in funds, weapons, training and institutional backing for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as the only internationally recognized military of the Lebanese state, the region remains a fuse capable of igniting a broader conflict and exposing the limits of both U.S. leverage and UN peacekeeping mandates along the Blue Line.
The Hormuz Complacency and the Oil Market
Despite the heightened tension, the global energy market is exhibiting what analysts call a dangerous “complacency.” In the last twenty-four hours, only thirty-two vessels transited the Strait of Hormuz-a sharp decline from the pre-war average of 110. However, since the blockade was lifted two weeks ago, Iran has exported roughly fifty million barrels of crude, leveraging pre-arranged contracts and shadow fleets to reassure key buyers.
This stability in supply has caused Brent crude to plummet, closing the second quarter around seventy-four dollars-a drop of nearly 30% over three months. Traders, focused on immediate flows rather than structural fragility, have treated the relative calm as a signal that both Tehran and Washington have strong incentives to keep oil moving.
The current calm in crude oil does not measure the absence of danger, but the myopia of those who have chosen not to look at it.
The economic risk is compounded by a diplomatic dispute over the governance of the Strait. Oman has proposed a system where shipping lines pay “service fees,” a term carefully distinguished from “tolls” to avoid violating international law. However, the Omani Foreign Minister, Badr al-Busaidi, has publicly rejected the notion of tolls, stressing that Muscat will not endorse any arrangement that appears to convert a key international waterway into a revenue instrument for regional powers.
The dispute is more than semantic; it is a battle over whether the world’s most critical oil choke point is governed by international law or by “disguised extortion.” The status of the Strait is shaped by the regime of transit passage under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, but coastal states have repeatedly tested its limits. With both Tehran and Washington flirting with the idea of charging for the “protection” of the waterway, the market is ignoring the upside risk: a single provocation by General Vahidi-such as a seizure, mining incident, or drone attack on shipping-could instantly reverse the price drop and reinstate a heavy risk premium, with direct implications for inflation, central bank policy and domestic politics far beyond the Gulf.
Venezuela: Decapitation Without Transition
In the Western Hemisphere, the “orphanhood of command” has taken a different, more tragic form. A double earthquake on 24 June-the deadliest in a century-has left 1,943 confirmed dead and over 60,000 missing. The International Organisation for Migration estimates that six million people have been affected, with two million in Caracas alone, overwhelming an already degraded public infrastructure hollowed out by years of mismanagement and sanctions.
The catastrophe has forced a diplomatic thaw. Washington, which recognized Delcy Rodríguez as acting president, is coordinating aid and easing certain restrictions to allow emergency supplies in. This follows “Operation Absolute Resolve” on 3 January, which saw the capture of Nicolás Maduro and his transfer to New York. While President Trump initially proclaimed that the U.S. “was in charge” in Venezuela, the administration has since rolled back that rhetoric to facilitate humanitarian relief and to avoid assuming formal responsibility for day-to-day governance.
However, the removal of Maduro has not resulted in a democratic transition. Power remains concentrated in the hands of the Rodríguez siblings-Delcy in the Executive and Jorge in the Assembly-who have preserved much of the old security apparatus. Despite the dismantling of narco-terrorist elements, including the June 9 killing of Humberto “el Niño Guerrero,” the transition to the leadership of Nobel laureate María Corina Machado and President-elect Edmundo González has stalled amid disputes over electoral sequencing, constitutional reforms and control of state oil revenues.
The current state of Venezuela mirrors the Iranian crisis: a successful military “decapitation” followed by a total failure in post-war architecture. With only $5.5 million of the $8 billion in oil sales this year reaching the Venezuelan people through salaries, pensions and basic imports, the risk is that the U.S. may settle for a “Chavism without Chávez,” trading a known dictator for an equally inept and corrupt administrative machinery. For regional democracies, the Venezuelan case is becoming a cautionary tale about regime change absent a clear, credible and locally owned blueprint for institutional reconstruction.
Ukraine’s Shift to the Russian Rear
Meanwhile, in Eastern Europe, Ukraine is attempting to invert the war of attrition. President Zelenskyy has launched a forty-day “influence operation” designed to force Moscow to the negotiating table through sustained pressure on the Russian interior rather than incremental gains along the front.
This campaign has seen one of the largest drone bombardments of the war, targeting critical infrastructure deep within Russian territory:
- The Tyumen refinery, located over 2,000 kilometers from the front.
- The Orenburg gas processing plant, which handles roughly 60% of Gazprom’s treated gas.
- Missile component factories in Voronezh.
- Two military satellite communications centers.
The strategic shift is significant; Kyiv is no longer merely defending territory but is now suffocating Russian logistics and energy production in depth, testing the resilience of a war economy that funds both the battlefield and the social contract inside Russia. The move also challenges Western red lines on the use of supplied weapons against targets on Russian soil, sharpening debates in European capitals over escalation, deterrence and alliance credibility.
While the U.S. continues its nuanced negotiations with Moscow, the upcoming NATO summit will serve as the ultimate test of allied resolve. If European partners fail to match their declarations with material deeds-ammunition production, air defense systems, long-range capabilities-they risk granting Putin the time necessary to recover from the current logistics crisis and to adapt to Ukraine’s new doctrine of striking deep.
The global landscape remains defined by a paradox where the removal of strongmen has not led to the arrival of stability, but rather to a fragmented authority that neither can nor will guarantee the peace it claims to seek. From Doha to Caracas, the central question is no longer how to decapitate regimes, but how to rebuild chains of command and institutions capable of enforcing any peace that is signed in their name.