VILNIUS – Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda said on Monday that the European Union’s 20th package of sanctions on Russia has been delayed by Hungary’s election season but insisted the measures will still move forward. “The sanctions package could have been adopted on February 24, marking the fourth anniversary of the war in Ukraine. Unfortunately, the process was prolonged due to the resistance of practically two European Union states,” Nauseda told reporters. “I don’t think this is some kind of principled resistance, but given that we are living in a pre-election period, so to speak, in Hungary, (…) (this – BNS) complicates decision-making at the EU level,” he added. (lrt.lt)
Nausėda said Vilnius wants a tougher, more comprehensive package. “We want the twentieth sanctions package not only to be adopted, but also to be adopted as broadly as possible,” he said. “It is also planned to additionally include financial institutions, shadow fleet vessels, and expand the list of both sanctioned companies and individuals,” the head of state noted. (lrt.lt)
Why a delayed 20th package matters now
The EU’s Russia sanctions are the core of its economic pressure campaign nearly four years into Moscow’s full‑scale invasion. Under EU law, restrictive measures are adopted in the Council by unanimous agreement of the 27 member states under the Common Foreign and Security Policy, giving each capital an effective veto over new designations or sectoral steps. Domestic political calendars, such as Hungary’s parliamentary vote set for April 12, 2026, can therefore become a practical brake on timing and scope.
EU leaders argue the sanctions constrain Russia’s war economy and signal long‑term political resolve, while frontline states like Lithuania contend that any easing would accelerate Russian rearmament and heighten regional risk. Nausėda’s insistence that the 20th package proceed despite delay underscores a broader debate in Brussels: whether the bloc can maintain a credible, rules‑based sanctions regime when unanimity makes it vulnerable to electoral pressures and bilateral bargaining.
Asta Skaisgirytė, the Lithuanian president’s chief foreign policy adviser, warned that lifting sanctions-even if the war ended-would embolden Moscow and reward its current strategy.
“If the war ended and sanctions against Russia were lifted, it would enable Russia to continue arming itself, to continue preparing new provocations, and perhaps to plan further aggressive actions. So, lifting sanctions would unequivocally be a bad thing for us and, I believe, for the entire Western community.”
She added that Belarus, “its enabler,” provided territory for the attack on Ukraine and remains a source of “hybrid attacks” on Lithuania, Latvia and Poland as Russian weaponry is deployed there. In Vilnius’s reading, sanctions are no longer just a tool of crisis management in Ukraine but a structural element of regional security policy aimed at deterring both Moscow and its closest ally.
What the EU has already targeted – and what’s next
Since 2022, the EU has adopted a rolling series of sanctions packages that have broadened export controls, locked out major banks, restricted energy revenues and blacklisted thousands of individuals and entities linked to Russia’s state apparatus, military‑industrial base and propaganda networks. The most recent fully adopted round-Package 19 on October 23, 2025-hit Russian energy flows, third‑country banks and crypto providers accused of facilitating circumvention, and expanded measures against entities tied to the oil “shadow fleet.” The 16th and 17th packages earlier in 2025 laid the legal groundwork to list non‑EU financial and crypto intermediaries that help evade the G7 oil price cap and sanctioned hundreds of tankers used to disguise Russian oil shipments.
Nausėda’s call to include more financial institutions and shadow‑fleet vessels in the 20th package aligns with this enforcement‑heavy trajectory. EU authorities have steadily tightened the net on maritime evasion: in 2025 alone, member states moved to list scores of additional tankers, adding port bans and service restrictions for ships identified as part of Russia’s sanctions‑dodging network. Those measures are designed to complement the G7 price cap and choke off opaque oil revenues that help finance the Kremlin’s war effort, while signaling to global shipping and insurance markets that EU compliance expectations will keep rising.
Hungary’s election calculus and the cost of unanimity
Budapest’s pre‑election environment has complicated consensus‑building in Brussels. Hungary’s parliamentary elections are scheduled for April 12, 2026, a contest widely seen as the toughest challenge to Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in years. With sanctions decisions taken by unanimity in the Council, Hungary’s objections-alongside earlier tactical resistance from Slovakia-have repeatedly slowed or diluted packages as national leaders leverage their blocking power for domestic or bilateral concessions.
The current delay over the 20th package follows similar episodes in 2025, when disputes in Bratislava and Budapest stalled previous rounds before eventual compromises were found. For officials in Vilnius and other hawkish capitals, this pattern has turned sanctions diplomacy into a recurring stress test of EU governance, raising questions about whether the bloc needs new mechanisms-such as faster review procedures or clearer criteria for lifting measures-to protect long‑term policy from short‑term electoral pressures.
Lithuania’s security picture: sanctions, deterrence and Belarus
For Lithuania, the fight over a single sanctions package is inseparable from a wider effort to harden NATO’s northeastern flank. Vilnius argues that rigorous sanctions enforcement is now a pillar of deterrence alongside forward‑deployed troops and national defense spending. The government has already decided to raise its defense budget to between 5% and 6% of GDP starting in 2026, citing persistent Russian aggression, the militarization of the Kaliningrad exclave and the need to build resilience with allies.
The 2026 National Threat Assessment by Lithuania’s domestic (VSD) and military (AOTD) intelligence services underscores those concerns. The report warns that if a peace deal froze the front in Ukraine and Western sanctions were lifted, Russia could be ready for limited military action in the Baltic Sea region within one to two years and for a large‑scale conflict with NATO within six to ten years. It cautions in particular against easing economic pressure while Moscow is expanding units along NATO borders and continuing force development in Kaliningrad and elsewhere.
Skaisgirytė’s emphasis on Belarus mirrors repeated findings in EU statements. Brussels has condemned Minsk’s role in hybrid operations on EU frontiers, including the instrumentalization of migrants and pressure on border infrastructure, while documenting how Belarus enabled Russia’s initial invasion by allowing forces to operate from its territory and continues to host advanced Russian weaponry. In this context, Nausėda’s demand for a “broad” 20th package is framed not as a symbolic gesture, but as part of a longer‑term strategy to lock in economic and political costs for both Russia and its closest regional enablers.
As of March 9, 2026, the EU’s 20th sanctions package has not been adopted. Any decision will require unanimous backing in the Council under the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy framework, setting up a collision between Hungary’s election calendar and the determination of frontline states such as Lithuania to keep sanctions pressure at the heart of Europe’s response to Russia’s war.
