WASHINGTON – Iran has accelerated efforts to physically seal off its stockpiles of highly enriched uranium, utilizing explosive mines and the intentional collapse of tunnels to obstruct access, according to U.S. intelligence sources.
The tactical fortification of these sites comes amid reports that the United States and Iran are nearing a diplomatic agreement that would require Tehran to relinquish its enriched uranium and dismantle key components of its nuclear infrastructure.
The simultaneous push toward a diplomatic settlement and the physical erasure of site access highlights a critical tension in the effort to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. By rendering stockpiles physically inaccessible, Tehran may be attempting to create “facts on the ground” that complicate the verification and extraction processes essential to any viable arms-control treaty.
The Logistics of Uranium Removal
A senior administration official recently indicated that the U.S. and Iran are close to a deal centered on the relinquishment of uranium that has been enriched to levels near weapons-grade. Reuters has further reported that the emerging framework would allow the U.S. to collect the regime’s enriched material as part of a broader dismantling of the nuclear program, building on provisions similar to those in the 2015 nuclear accord, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
Under that earlier agreement, Iran accepted strict limits on enrichment and intrusive inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Any new deal would require updated verification rules to account for the altered physical state of the sites now being hardened or collapsed.
President Donald Trump has identified the retrieval of this material as a primary objective of the negotiations. Trump has previously asserted that the technical capability to safely extract and transport such volatile materials is limited, claiming only the U.S. and possibly China possess the necessary expertise.
However, the physical state of the storage sites now threatens the feasibility of these plans. The use of explosive mines and structural collapses suggests a strategy of denial, ensuring that if a deal fails-or if a military intervention occurs-the materials remain unreachable.
Former head of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Material Removal, Scott Roecker, warned that these fortifications could force a compromise in verification protocols. Roecker noted that negotiators might be compelled to allow Iran to move uranium to a central location for removal rather than verifying it in situ.
“In this scenario, I would worry that Iran would claim that some portion of the HEU was irretrievable. We wouldn’t have full confidence that Iran couldn’t retain access to it at some point in the future,” Roecker told CNN.
Such a shift would place additional pressure on U.S. and European officials to design chain‑of‑custody procedures and on‑the‑ground monitoring robust enough to reassure lawmakers and skeptical regional partners that no material is being diverted.
Strategic Divergence on Force
The reported fortifications have reignited debates within the U.S. and its allies regarding the efficacy of diplomacy versus direct kinetic action to neutralize the nuclear threat. Inside Washington, the developments are already feeding into congressional oversight discussions about sanctions relief, security guarantees for regional allies and the conditions under which any agreement would be certified and periodically renewed.
Yoav Gallant, the former defense minister of Israel, argued that the window for a decisive military solution was missed during recent hostilities. In an interview with 103FM, Gallant suggested that a joint U.S.-Israeli operation to seize the material by force would have been the only way to ensure the program’s total collapse.
“We should have gone and brought the enriched uranium by force in a military operation during the campaign. That would have uprooted the nuclear program from Iran,” Gallant said.
The technical challenge of such an operation is compounded by the nature of the materials involved:
- High-Enriched Uranium (HEU): Materials enriched beyond 20% are considered HEU; uranium enriched to 60% is technically close to the 90% threshold required for a nuclear weapon, sharply reducing the time Iran would need to “break out” if it chose to cross that line.
- Site Hardening: The use of deep-mountain tunneling and reinforced concrete makes conventional airstrikes insufficient for material recovery and raises the risk of dispersing or losing control of radioactive material during any attempted raid.
- Verification Gaps: The International Atomic Energy Agency has repeatedly cited gaps in Iran’s declarations regarding past nuclear activities, forcing inspectors and member states to rely heavily on corroborating intelligence even when cameras and seals are in place.
The current situation places the U.S. in a precarious position, balancing a desire for a diplomatic breakthrough with the reality that the physical evidence and materials it seeks to secure are being systematically buried or mined. Any agreement will have to convince not only allies in Europe and the Middle East but also a divided U.S. Congress that the combination of inspections, technical controls and enforcement mechanisms can withstand efforts to hide or entomb critical stockpiles.
The International Atomic Energy Agency continues to monitor Iranian nuclear sites, though its access has been intermittently restricted by Tehran. Diplomats say the coming weeks will test whether those monitoring arrangements-and the broader nonproliferation regime built around them-can adapt quickly enough to keep pace with Iran’s rapidly changing nuclear landscape.
Related reading
