ARLINGTON, Virginia – Pete Hegseth, the U.S. secretary of defense, used a Pentagon briefing to sharply criticize Nato allies, including the United Kingdom, and to signal that reopening the Strait of Hormuz should not be treated as a solely American responsibility. “It’s not just a U.S. problem set, it’s not just us, other countries should pay attention,” he said at the briefing.
Hegseth was asked whether opening the Strait of Hormuz was an “essential” objective of the war. He did not give a simple yes, instead emphasizing efforts aimed at degrading Iran’s missiles, its ability to project power and its nuclear capabilities.
The comments place allied burden‑sharing at the center of Washington’s messaging and outline the administration’s stated military focus areas without tying them to a specific maritime requirement, leaving operational choices on sea lanes formally open while underscoring a broader campaign against Iran’s military infrastructure.
What Hegseth emphasized at the Pentagon
- When pressed on whether opening the Strait of Hormuz was an “essential” objective of the war, he avoided a simple yes and framed it as one element within a wider regional campaign.
- He outlined U.S. objectives as degrading Iran’s missiles, its ability to project power and its nuclear capabilities, suggesting those targets will shape operational planning more than any single geographic choke point.
- On allied roles, he said: “It’s not just a U.S. problem set, it’s not just us, other countries should pay attention,” explicitly casting the current crisis as a test of Nato and other partners’ willingness to act.
- He said other countries – meaning Nato, and including the UK – should “start learning to fight for yourself,” a remark likely to resonate in ongoing debates over defense spending and force readiness in European capitals.
Gary O’Donoghue
Chief North America correspondent
Allied burden‑sharing and Nato’s chartered responsibilities
Nato is a transatlantic defense alliance founded in 1949. Its treaty anchors collective defense under Article 5 and also requires each ally, under Article 3, to maintain and develop individual and collective capacity to resist attack. Those obligations, set out in the North Atlantic Treaty, are the formal backdrop to U.S. calls for more European and Canadian investment in defense and greater operational contribution beyond the alliance’s own territory.
Hegseth’s remarks tie his call for greater allied initiative directly to those standing obligations, framing the Strait of Hormuz and related security tasks as shared responsibilities rather than a U.S.-only “problem set.” By invoking Nato allies by name, including the UK, he effectively challenged governments that have relied for decades on American naval power to secure global shipping to demonstrate they can independently generate and sustain high‑end maritime forces when key sea lanes are threatened.
The comments also intersect with domestic policy debates on both sides of the Atlantic. In Washington, they reinforce long‑running pressure on allies that fall short of Nato’s agreed benchmark of spending 2% of GDP on defense. In London and other European capitals, they are likely to feed into budget and force‑structure reviews that weigh costly blue‑water capabilities – such as carrier groups and escort fleets – against other domestic priorities.
The Strait of Hormuz in focus
The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow maritime chokepoint connecting the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. It is a critical route for global oil and gas shipments as well as commercial traffic, with a significant share of the world’s seaborne energy exports transiting its waters in normal times.
By declining to declare reopening the strait an “essential” objective while detailing priority targets related to Iran, Hegseth drew a distinction between broader regional security aims and the specific question of guaranteed passage. That distinction allows the administration to keep diplomatic and military options open: it can continue to pressure Iran’s missile and nuclear programs while encouraging a coalition of willing partners – rather than the U.S. alone – to take on the politically sensitive task of escorting or protecting commercial shipping.
For industry and markets, the nuance matters. A declared U.S. commitment to unilaterally “reopen” the strait would imply a large, sustained American naval deployment. By contrast, Hegseth’s language signals that Washington expects energy‑importing nations, including in Europe and Asia, to weigh the security of their own supply routes and consider what they are prepared to contribute.
Reference to the UK and Britain’s Royal Navy
Hegseth’s criticism was threaded throughout the briefing and included a pointed swipe at Britain’s Royal Navy, historically one of Washington’s closest and most capable maritime partners. He linked those remarks to a wider message that Nato members – including the UK – should be prepared to shoulder more of the operational burden in high‑risk environments such as the Gulf.
He said these other countries, meaning Nato – and including the UK – should, as he put it, “start learning to fight for yourself.”
For the UK government, that warning lands amid intense scrutiny of fleet size, carrier strike availability and the country’s ability to sustain deployments east of Suez. It also raises questions for policymakers about how closely Britain aligns future naval planning with U.S. expectations that allies can independently protect critical sea lanes, rather than relying on American ships as a permanent backstop.
Hegseth did not give a simple yes when asked whether opening the Strait of Hormuz was an “essential” objective of the war. But by tying his answer to Iran’s military capabilities and to Nato’s treaty‑based responsibilities, he made clear that Washington sees the current crisis not only as a test of Iran’s reach – but also as a test of allied will.
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