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Iran’s foreign minister Abbas Araghchi said he has been in direct contact with United States President Donald Trump’s top envoy Steve Witkoff during the current war, but insisted those exchanges do not amount to negotiations, in an interview aired Tuesday, March 31, 2026, by Al Jazeera. He also asserted that Iran and Oman will determine the postwar regime for the Strait of Hormuz and vowed Tehran is prepared to meet any U.S. ground incursion.
The remarks underscore a dangerous mix of back-channel messaging and battlefield escalation centered on the world’s most sensitive energy chokepoint. Roughly a fifth of globally traded oil moves through the Strait of Hormuz in peacetime, magnifying the stakes of any disruption as insurance costs spike, navies surge into the region, and commercial shippers, regulators and central banks reassess risk.
Back-channel contact, but ‘no negotiations’
Araghchi said the United States has been reaching out through Witkoff, whom he described as Trump’s trusted emissary for peace efforts. He emphasized that Tehran sees the contact as message-passing, not talks.
“I receive messages from Witkoff directly, as before, and this does not mean that we are in negotiations,”
“There is no truth to the claim of negotiations with any party in Iran. All messages are conveyed through the Foreign Ministry or received by it, and there are communications between security agencies,” he said.
Araghchi argued Iran has “never had a good experience” negotiating with Washington, citing the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear agreement during Trump’s first term and alleging attacks on Iran while talks were underway. “We do not have any faith that negotiations with the US will yield any results. The trust level is at zero,” he said, adding: “We don’t see honesty.”
The foreign minister said the current war began on February 28, 2026, and referred to a prior U.S. strike in June 2025 as evidence for Tehran’s mistrust. Historically, Oman has hosted quiet U.S.-Iran channels that helped unlock the 2015 nuclear accord, and third-country conduits such as Switzerland and Qatar have relayed messages at moments of acute tension. Araghchi’s comments suggest a similar reliance on intermediaries even as formal diplomacy remains frozen and formal negotiating formats, such as the earlier P5+1 framework, remain dormant.
For policy-makers in Washington and European capitals, the distinction Araghchi draws between “messages” and “negotiations” matters: it allows both sides to manage domestic hardliners while still testing red lines and de‑confliction options, but leaves no obvious venue for binding commitments or verification.
Hormuz: Tehran’s claim, global rules
On the future of the Strait of Hormuz, Araghchi asserted that the waterway “falls under the territorial control of Iran and Oman,” adding that once the war ends, those two states “would decide the future of the waterway.” He also said the strait should be a “peaceful waterway.”
From Iran’s perspective, he continued, Hormuz remains open to most traffic. “Only for the ships of those who are at war with us, this strait is closed. That is normal during war – we cannot let our enemies use our territorial waters for commerce,” he said. “Ships linked to other countries – because of security concerns, because of high insurance prices, or whatever other reason – they have decided not to use the strait,” he added. He said Indian, Pakistani, Turkish and Chinese vessels have transited after coordinating with Tehran.
International maritime law treats Hormuz as an international strait that connects two areas of high seas, where a form of “transit passage” protects commercial navigation. That regime is codified in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which most governments cite to argue that coastal states cannot suspend transit passage even in wartime. While littoral states can regulate safety and environmental measures, most governments reject unilateral attempts to close such straits to neutral shipping. Those long-standing principles sat uneasily with the “Tanker War” of the 1980s, periodic mine and missile incidents since, and the 2019 tit-for-tat tanker seizures, all of which show how quickly legal norms collide with military facts when the Gulf heats up.
Gulf governments, including Qatar, have said they must be included in any discussion about Hormuz’s future. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have built pipelines to the Red Sea and Oman’s coast to reduce exposure to the strait, but those lines cannot fully substitute for Hormuz’s capacity, leaving the global system vulnerable to even partial closures or heightened risk premiums. Energy ministries, finance officials and shipping regulators from Asia to Europe now face renewed contingency planning over fuel security, freight costs and possible rationing if flows through Hormuz are cut further.
Pakistan’s quiet shuttle and China’s shadow
Officials cited by Al Jazeera said Pakistan has facilitated recent Araghchi-Witkoff contacts and hosted Saudi, Egyptian and Turkish officials last weekend to build momentum for eventual U.S.-Iran direct talks. Pakistan’s deputy prime minister and foreign minister, Ishaq Dar, traveled to Beijing on Tuesday seeking Chinese support for those efforts.
The flurry reflects a familiar architecture: Oman as a traditional confidential conduit, Pakistan as a neighbor with ties to Gulf monarchies and Tehran, and China as Iran’s largest oil customer and a power with growing equities in Persian Gulf stability. None of the actors has announced a formal framework, and Araghchi’s categorical denial of negotiations suggests back channels remain limited to message exchanges.
For diplomats and defense planners, the emerging pattern resembles previous crisis-management efforts in the Gulf: informal “contact groups,” shuttle visits, and ad hoc security understandings rather than a single, treaty-based mechanism. That leaves room for rapid improvisation but also risks fragmented messaging if Washington, Tehran and Beijing read the intermediaries’ signals differently.
Rhetoric over a U.S. ground move
Even as Trump officials speak publicly about diplomacy, Washington has accelerated troop flows to the Gulf, and U.S. media have reported Pentagon planning for a possible ground option.
Asked about that, Araghchi offered a blunt warning. “We are waiting for them,” he said. “I don’t think they’d dare to do such a thing. There will be a lot of strength waiting for them.” He added: “We know very well how to defend ourselves. In a ground war, we can do it even better. We are completely ready to confront any sort of ground attack. We hope they do not make such a mistake,” framing a land fight as terrain where Iran believes it holds advantages.
Those statements recall Iran’s doctrine of layered defense and attrition, relying on regular forces, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and allied militias, combined with missiles, drones and naval swarms to complicate any large-scale U.S. operation. The risk, however, is that deterrent rhetoric and force movements on both sides compress decision time and raise the chance of miscalculation in crowded sea lanes. Military-to-military de‑confliction channels, which have helped avoid direct clashes in other theaters, are notably absent or opaque in the current Gulf crisis.
Energy and shipping on a knife-edge
War-risk insurers have historically designated the Strait of Hormuz and parts of the Arabian Sea as high-risk zones when tensions flare, driving up premiums and routing changes. Diversions around the Arabian Peninsula add significant time and cost, while Red Sea passages have themselves faced security challenges in recent years, limiting alternate options.
Key precedents shape operator behavior:
- 1984-88: The Iran-Iraq “Tanker War,” U.S.-led convoying (Operation Earnest Will) and the 1988 U.S.-Iran naval clash.
- 2019: Attacks on tankers and dual seizures by Iran and Western forces, prompting rapid insurance re-ratings and naval escorts.
- 2026: With war beginning on February 28, shipowners weigh higher premiums, flag-state guidance and the viability of liaison with coastal states for safe passage.
For now, Araghchi’s position is that traffic from countries not at war with Iran can continue, subject to security coordination, while vessels linked to belligerents are barred. That stance, combined with the legal sensitivities around international straits, leaves navies and insurers calibrating risk day by day.
Regulators and shipowners are also watching how sanctions and compliance rules will be interpreted if Hormuz becomes partially inaccessible. Guidance from major flag states and international bodies such as the International Maritime Organization, which sets global safety and security standards for shipping, will help determine whether operators keep vessels in the corridor or divert to longer and costlier routes.
As of Tuesday, March 31, 2026, Iran maintains that communications with Washington do not constitute negotiations, Pakistan continues facilitating contacts, and Tehran says the Strait of Hormuz remains open to most shipping except vessels of states “at war” with Iran. For governments, central banks and corporate boards, those assurances are being weighed against the hard geography of a narrow strait now sitting at the center of a live war.
