RIGA – The strategic collapse of Latvia’s transit economy, once a cornerstone of the nation’s GDP, has left the country’s primary ports facing a crisis of legitimacy and solvency. As cargo volumes plummet and revenue streams evaporate, industry leaders warn that a combination of rigid geopolitical posturing and systemic institutional failure has handed a decisive economic victory to the Kremlin.
The decline represents more than a local industrial downturn; it is a stark illustration of the “decoupling” process between the European Union and Russia. While the West seeks to isolate the Russian economy through sanctions, the resulting vacuum has not been filled by new trade partners, but rather by Russia’s own strategic diversion of cargo to its domestic terminals.
Leonīds Loginovs, former Chief Executive of the Freeport of Riga Authority and a member of the Council of the Latvian Stevedoring Companies Association (LSA), argues that Latvia has systematically undermined its own bargaining power.
“Latvia always wants to run ahead of the train. It is a characteristic national trait-or perhaps a national flaw, depending on how one chooses to describe it-but there are situations in which it works very much to our disadvantage,” Loginovs said.
The Geopolitical Cost of Solidarity
For decades, the Baltic States served as the essential bridge between the resource-rich interior of Eurasia and the markets of the West. However, the weaponization of trade following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally altered this flow, accelerating the shift of east-west freight corridors away from Baltic ports and into Russian territory.
Loginovs points to the handling of mineral fertilizers as a primary example of policy failure. While Lithuania has maintained what he describes as a pragmatic approach to imports-including sourcing from Russian plants like KuibyshevAzot that are not under sanction-Latvia has hesitated due to diplomatic optics and a stricter reading of political risk.
“Farmers have a genuine problem, but for us the main priority seems to be looking good in the eyes of Brussels-and perhaps even the Pentagon,” Loginovs noted, referring to the European Union’s common sanctions framework and the broader NATO security posture that heavily shapes Latvian political debate.
This tendency to prioritize external approval over internal economic stability is, according to Loginovs, a psychological remnant of the past.
“The problem is that we always want to please some higher authority. Once it was Moscow; now it is Brussels. Not much has changed-only the geographical direction. Psychologically, we are still living in the role of a servant,” he said.
The consequences are most visible in the potash trade. After deteriorating relations between Belarus and Lithuania led to the closure of the Port of Klaipėda to Belarusian potash, Latvia declined to step in, citing solidarity with its neighbor and a commitment to the European Union’s collective approach on Belarus and Russia.
“The Lithuanians have never been overly concerned about solidarity. They even dismantled railway tracks leading towards Latvia to prevent cargo from being redirected here,” Loginovs said.
Strategic Divergence and the Russian Pivot
The belief that sanctions and the cessation of transit have severely harmed the Russian economy is, according to industry data, a misconception. Russia has spent years building massive, state-of-the-art terminals in St. Petersburg and Ust-Luga to ensure it no longer relies on Baltic intermediaries, a policy shift that pre-dated the full-scale invasion but has since been turbocharged by wartime logistics.
The shift has been effectively permanent. Cargo that previously funded Latvian infrastructure is now processed entirely within Russian borders, increasing the Kremlin’s direct revenue and reducing its vulnerability to EU transit chokepoints.
“We have not hurt Russia at all. We have only helped it,” Loginovs said. “Today, the Russians are earning three times more from that business than we ever did.”
The economic delta is stark:
- 2017 baseline: The Freeport of Riga supported approximately 20,000 direct and indirect jobs, anchoring entire local supply chains from rail to warehousing.
- Fiscal impact: Every tonne of transit cargo generated roughly EUR 15 for the state budget through port dues, rail tariffs, and associated taxes.
- Revenue loss: At peak volumes of 40 million tonnes, the sector contributed approximately EUR 600 million annually-money that once underwrote public services and infrastructure investment.
Institutional Paralysis and the Port Model
Beyond geopolitics, Latvia is grappling with what critics see as a dysfunctional governance model that blurs commercial and political decision-making. Loginovs argues that the country’s port management is an anomaly that discourages long-term capital.
He suggests that Latvia should have adopted a model similar to that of the United States, where a central port authority owns the terminals and leases them to private operators under strict, transparent conditions and clear concession rules. Instead, Latvia implemented a fragmented system in 1994, distributing influence between municipalities and the central government, that has since entered a state of legal limbo.
A port reform initiated by the New Conservative Party (JKP) remains unfinished, leaving the ports of Ventspils and Liepāja operating without a modernized legal framework at a time when investors demand predictability over ownership, governance, and state-aid rules.
“Investors are reluctant to commit their money because the legislation remains unfinished and the legal framework has yet to be finalised,” Loginovs said.
This paralysis extends to the boardrooms. State Secretaries from four different ministries sit on the port boards, yet Loginovs claims they act as passive observers rather than strategic advocates, raising questions about accountability lines between ministers, civil servants and port management.
“They come to a board meeting, sit there for a while, review a few issues, collect their remuneration and leave,” he said. “They do nothing, while the system remains just as dysfunctional as it has always been.”
Latvia’s ports operate within the broader framework of the European Union’s [Port Services Regulation], which seeks to open access to port services and clarify financial transparency. But industry figures argue that without coherent national legislation and a settled ownership model, EU rules alone cannot restore confidence or compensate for the loss of Russia-related cargo.
The Security Imperative
Despite the commercial collapse, the ports remain critical pieces of NATO’s eastern flank infrastructure. For Brussels, Washington and Riga alike, the maintenance of these facilities is no longer only a matter of profit, but of strategic readiness, redundancy and surge capacity in the event of a crisis.
Loginovs recalls the early 2000s, when the Port of Riga worked closely with the U.S. Pentagon to move military equipment into Central Asia, a process that led to the establishment of a specialized Port Police force after consultations in New York. That experience, he suggests, shows how commercial platforms can be rapidly repurposed for allied operations if the infrastructure is kept in working order.
He warns that the current mindset of the Latvian government ignores the necessity of maintaining “ghost” infrastructure for military contingencies-berths, rail links and storage that may rarely be used in peacetime but are essential in war.
“Port infrastructure has to be maintained because ships carrying military cargo must be serviced. A vessel cannot simply enter a port and be left to fend for itself,” he said.
This lack of strategic depth, in his view, extends to government communication. Loginovs criticized a recent high-profile Cabinet meeting in the Latgale region, where the government publicly announced plans to build a military factory with Ukraine.
“What were they thinking? That is precisely the kind of information that should remain confidential. If a military factory is built there, then it is obvious that it will become the first target for a missile,” Loginovs said, arguing that strategic infrastructure policy now has to be drafted with wartime targeting in mind.
Against this backdrop, the Latvian Ministry of Transport has recently established an operational working group, chaired by Minister Rihards Kozlovskis, to address the industry’s concerns regarding tariffs and fuel price mitigation and to prevent further erosion of rail and port capacity. On June 30, EUR 24.49 million was allocated to the national railway to maintain financial balance for 2025-a short-term lifeline that underscores how transport policy, fiscal choices and national security planning are becoming increasingly intertwined.
As Latvia tries to navigate between EU solidarity, NATO deterrence and domestic economic survival, the unresolved question is whether incremental measures and working groups can reverse a structural shift that has already redirected the region’s trade flows-and whether Riga is willing to redefine its ports as strategic assets first, and commercial ventures second, before more of its transit economy disappears for good.