ANKARA – NATO members are convening for the annual summit in Ankara amid the fastest increase in alliance defense spending in years, though a widening gap has emerged between frontline eastern states and the alliance’s larger western economies.
While nearly all allies have now reached the long-standing 2 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) spending benchmark, a more aggressive target established during the previous summit in The Hague is exposing significant fiscal strains. The shift reveals an alliance rearming at disparate speeds, driven primarily by the immediate security threats facing members bordering Russia.
The 2035 Spending Mandate
At the summit in The Hague, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) raised its financial requirements to meet modern security challenges. Members agreed to a total defense-related spending target of 5 per cent of GDP by 2035.
This represents a substantial escalation from the earlier commitment, first formalized in the 2014 Wales summit, that allies would “move towards” spending at least 2 per cent of GDP on defense. Under the new framework – which leaders are expected to reference in Ankara – spending is not only higher but more tightly defined, with clearer political expectations for how national budgets are structured.
This new target is divided into two specific categories:
- Core Military Spending: A minimum of 3.5 per cent of GDP, covering personnel, equipment, readiness, and contributions to NATO operations.
- Broader Security Priorities: Up to 1.5 per cent of GDP, covering cyber defense, infrastructure, and civil resilience.
While the previous 2 per cent goal was a point of contention for years, the 3.5 per cent core threshold remains out of reach for most. The United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany currently remain below this new benchmark, underscoring the scale of fiscal and political adjustments that will be required in the next decade.
The mandate builds on NATO’s founding treaty and subsequent summit decisions, but leaders are now treating the 5 per cent target as a de facto planning framework for national defense and security strategies under the alliance’s own governance structures, including the North Atlantic Treaty.
Regional Divergence in Rearmament
The data indicates a sharp divide between the alliance’s eastern flank and its western members. Countries in closer proximity to Russia have accelerated their budgets more aggressively since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, often tying multi‑year spending laws directly to perceived frontline risks.
Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Norway, and Denmark have recorded the most significant increases in defense spending as a share of GDP over the last decade. This acceleration reflects a geopolitical shift where Nordic and Eastern European members are now leading the alliance’s rearmament efforts and, in several cases, are already planning for defense outlays well beyond the 2 per cent floor.
In contrast, the United States has seen a relative decline in its proportional contribution. Although it remains the largest spender in absolute terms, U.S. military spending fell from 3.71 per cent of GDP in 2014 to approximately 3.2 per cent today. For many European governments, this has reinforced the political case for greater “European pillar” responsibility within NATO, even as Washington continues to underwrite much of the alliance’s high-end capabilities.
Fiscal Constraints and Budgetary Gaps
The push toward the 2035 targets is creating friction within European national budgets, forcing finance ministries to reopen medium‑term expenditure plans and, in some cases, rewrite fiscal rules. Some nations have implemented legislative changes to accommodate the costs, while others face funding shortfalls that could test public tolerance for sustained increases in military outlays.
Germany has exempted defense spending from its constitutional borrowing limits. The government plans to more than double its military budget, targeting over €200 billion ($228 billion) by 2030, effectively establishing defense as a protected category in fiscal negotiations and signaling a long‑term structural shift in Berlin’s budgetary priorities.
Other major economies are struggling to match this pace:
- United Kingdom: A recent £15 billion ($20 billion) defense package has failed to close a significant funding gap identified by the country’s own defense planners.
- France: Aiming for approximately 2.5 per cent of GDP by 2030, amid parallel pressure to finance industrial policy and social spending.
- Italy: Targeting 2.8 per cent for the coming year, with coalition partners divided over how quickly to move beyond current levels.
- Spain: Has ruled out increasing spending beyond 2.1 per cent, citing domestic budget constraints and competing social priorities.
Across these capitals, lawmakers are weighing how to write the 2035 mandate into national medium‑term frameworks, defense planning laws, and multi‑year procurement contracts, turning summit language into binding domestic policy.
Turkey’s Transition to Defense Supplier
Turkey currently spends 2.33 per cent of its GDP on defense, placing it in the middle of NATO rankings. However, the nation’s strategic role has evolved from a consumer of security to a primary supplier for the alliance, a shift Ankara is expected to showcase during the summit it is hosting.
Following the 2004 Istanbul summit, Turkey’s defense and aerospace exports expanded from approximately $196 million to more than $10 billion in 2025. Currently, 57 per cent of these exports are destined for fellow NATO members, positioning Turkey as a key industrial pillar for European rearmament and giving Ankara additional leverage in debates over capability gaps, technology transfer, and joint procurement.
Turkish officials argue that a stronger indigenous defense sector also supports alliance resilience, reducing dependence on non‑NATO suppliers and helping partners meet the “core” share of the new spending mandate through interoperable systems.
Compliance and Data Verification
The alliance has begun intensifying its scrutiny of member contributions to ensure the 2 per cent benchmark is genuinely met and that reported figures are comparable across national accounting systems. NATO defense planners and finance ministries are working more closely to align definitions of eligible spending, from pensions and military aid to cyber and critical infrastructure.
NATO has reportedly requested that Albania, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic resubmit portions of their defense spending data following questions regarding the accuracy of their reported figures. Officials say the tighter review is intended to preserve political trust inside the alliance at a moment when spending promises are central to deterrence messaging toward Russia.
Member states continue to negotiate the implementation of the 2035 targets as the Ankara summit proceeds, with discussions focused on how to phase increases over time, how strictly to separate “core” from broader security spending, and how to respond if allies fall short. The outcome will shape not only military posture on NATO’s eastern flank, but also the domestic fiscal and governance choices facing leaders across Europe and North America in the decade ahead.